Die plunderung der welt pdf


    Free Download Books Die-plunderung-der-welt-wie-die-finanzeliten-unsere- enteignung-planen Printablefile. Everyone knows that reading. Die Plünderung der Welt by Michael Maier is Economics Unbemerkt von der Öffentlichkeit treibt eine internationale Clique aus Politikern. Drucken der PDF-Datei ist eine Urheberrechtsverletzung.. Barrierefreie Es ist der Mob, der auf den Startschuß zum Plündern wartet» (Scheen a, 3).

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    Die Plunderung Der Welt Pdf

    full ebook format sestep user manual by cecelia ahern. repair manual download by najiba ahmad die plunderung der welt wie die finanzeliten unsere. Jahrhunderts, Vol Aufbruch zur Weltwirtschaft, Munich: Kindler, ). Eben von Racknitz, Ines, Die Plünderung des Yuanming yuan. load/pdf/Capital- verbatimura.gq (last accessed ) (German original: Marx, Karl, Das Kapital. K Jamal, MS Maier, S Sunder. Yale School of Management, 11, Die Plünderung der Welt: wie die Finanz-Eliten unsere Enteignung planen. M Maier.

    Organization of the armies of the barbarian states that emerged on the coasts of the Mediterranean Sea in the 5th and 6th centuries can only partially be reconstructed. Primary sources and archeological records vary depending on the Primary sources and archeological records vary depending on the state. The preserved evidence relating to the military power of the Vandals and Goths is relatively good, much less is known about the Svevs. All of the discussed barbarian armies were presumably grouped into units based on ten. Better insight can only be provided into the top military ranks. An interesting issue presented in the thesis is to what degree the former tribal structures were preserved and how far the Roman models were followed by the barbaric people. None of the armies of the kingdoms referred to above can fully be compared with the Germanic army that existed in the north of the Medieval Europe, which inevitably leads to substantive errors. All the foregoing kingdoms had armies mostly composed of native warriors which, however, did not guarantee their purely Germanic character. The author tries to determine to what extent the Roman population or inhabitants of certain provinces, e. Research Interests:.

    London—New York: Routledge. Cambridge: Polity Press. New York: Oxford University Press. Understanding Linguistic Diversity. London: Continuum. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Multilingualism for Effective Communication. GRIN, F. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang. Multi-level Governance and European Integration. Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield.

    Synergies Europe 3: 25— Social Indicators Research. DOI: KUUS, M. Geopolitics and Expertise. Knowledge and Authority in European Diplomacy.

    Oxford: Wiley Blackwell. Paris: Champion. Maier, M. Spiegel bestseller. Dutch mainstream political parties have been supporting the establishment of the single market in the Maastricht Treaty in order to profit optimally from a financial-economic policy that is based first and foremost on ever increasing markets, trade and export [30].

    This massive mainstream support for transnational concepts, like Europeanization and globalization ties in with the classical Dutch state policy of 'mercantilism' and matches very well with the ideology of 'neoliberalism'.

    Barbier [ The Netherlands is traditionally of the liberal type characterized by its genuine "mercantile" spirit but it has in due course adopted elements of the other two models as well.

    This has yielded a hybrid type of welfare state. Recently, under the pressure of the global neoliberal market forces the liberal profile has received the upper hand, though.

    A liberal policy is considered to be a recipe to solve the eurozone crisis.

    In a neo-liberal state, the state withdraws from the social-economic domains, citizens are expected to become directly responsible for their own social welfare, and the state has no other obligation than facilitating its citizens to obtain more social welfare strictly restricted to its territory.

    Due to this neoliberal policy the Dutch lower and middle classes fear that they cannot rely any longer on the state for their social welfare and the traditional social protection.

    Although the neoliberal ideology has dominated thinking about the preservation of the social welfare state in the Netherlands different responses to the challenges of Europeanization, globalization and the ensuing eurozone crisis have also appeared in recent times.

    Anti-establishment parties have successfully mobilized the fears among the Dutch electorate, especially since the outbreak of the eurozone crisis in threatening that the Netherlands would leave the eurozone in order to protect its own national welfare system. Furthermore, the absence of positive integration in the domain of migration policy has given anti-establishment parties an extensive electoral agenda [32].

    In the traditional neighborhoods of larger Dutch cities the local commoners had to pay the price of worsening social services due to the neoliberal state policy. In these neighborhoods the social relations were already tensed because of a massive influx of migrants, especially those migrants with a different, non-West European cultural background having not been absorbed and assimilated successfully.

    In , on the waves of these social tensions Dutch anti-establishment politician Pim Fortuyn succeeded in mobilizing large groups of commoners to strengthen Dutch national identity, to put a more restrictive migration policy and an anti-European stance on the political agenda.

    The PVV has been successfully challenging the mainstream political parties with anti-establishment, strong anti-immigration, anti-Islam, and Eurosceptic rhetoric.

    The party entered the Dutch Parliament in and doubled its mandates in the parliamentary elections. As an outcome of these elections, the party agreed to back a centre right-liberal minority government of liberals VVD and Christian democrats CDA, the Call of Christian Democracy resulting into the First Rutte cabinet. This cabinet had to step down however due to the fact that the PVV withdrew its support for new austerity measures.

    SY5450 - Stoof - Appell an die Wissenschaft.pdf

    Since then the relation between the PVV and the mainstream parties cooled down because it became clear that the PVV does not want to take any responsibility for electorally delicate measures.

    This has led to a clear division between the mainstream left-liberal parties and anti-establishment parties. In fact, this political demarcation correlates with a societal demarcation, as has been observed in a recent study entitled "Separate Worlds" [33].

    Boven et al. Furthermore, they discovered that these values correlate with party preference. The former values being popular among the electorate of mainstream left-liberal parties, while the latter ones among the electorate of anti-establishment parties, like the PVV and its socialist counterpart Eurosceptic SP Socialist Party.

    With respect to the Dutch case, I will discuss two patterns of multilingual and communicative communication in the framework of the floral figuration model. The first pattern concentrates on the communication between the Brussels core and the Dutch commoners that is mediated via the national cosmopolitans.

    I will demonstrate that it involves a pattern of exclusion. A second pattern of linguistic and communicative exclusion concerns the migrants in the Netherlands. Forked tongue speak A key role is played by the national cosmopolitans who are acting as an interface between the Brussels Eurostars and their peer commoners.

    PM Rutte is an active player in the Brussels political arena, the intermediate sphere referred to above. Rutte and his liberal supporters who can be classified as national cosmopolitans are acting as interfaces between the Eurostars and the Dutch electorate that has been growing more sympathetic to Euroscepticism over the years.

    Marek Wilczyński | Pedagogical University of Kraków - verbatimura.gq

    Rutte is generally viewed as a "Janus-faced politician" and speaking with a "forked tongue". His VVD party tries to sell this double-position of the Dutch PM as a clever negotiation strategy: "If you say in Brussels always yes they will like you. If you say once in a while no they take you serious. They take Mark serious in Europe"[34]. The argument of Rutte's supporters is that an Eurosceptic attitude in Brussels is necessary to get a better negotiation position and to convince Dutch Eurosceptic voters that the South European countries will be financially supported in the end but not at any price.

    The Dutch PM, who is aware of his Janus-faced position, is playing tactical language games in media performances. Rutte attended the European summit of November where the Union's long term budget and the Greek financial crisis was discussed, as he stated with "a loaded gun in his pocket" but he quickly added that he will not use it, however: "If you put it on the table, you put the negotiations under such a pressure that they will have no result" [35].

    Due to the interface position of national cosmopolitan politicians they are necessarily Janus-faced politicians who speak with a forked tongue. Being part of the intermediate sphere in Brussels and at the same time participating in their home political arena they target their messages to different audiences simultaneously and address their electorate in a reflexive communication style [33].

    Rutte's sentences are long and the topics are complicated, when Rutte refers to his model of Social Europe as "the participation society", which implies the participation of every citizen in "a complex network society" in fact [36].

    Here a complex network society is understood in the sense of Castells [37; 38]. However, such concepts are rather difficult to grasp for common citizens.

    Eurosceptics have a more transparent position in the level-playing field which is the outer circles in the floral figuration model. Although they are present in the Brussels arena they do not really participate in it, they are not part of the intermediate sphere where Brussels politics is made and hence there is no need for "doublespeak" [39].

    Anti-establishment politicians can address the electorate in their own vernacular, in language easier to process, and in a direct communication style.

    Wilders and his PVV express a clear anti-European stance, even though they are represented in the EP, when they warn the electorate for the Netherlands becoming a "province of the European super-state. Jean-Claude Juncker, the president of the European Commission, accused the mainstream Dutch parties of not protecting the EU in the Dutch referendum on the European Constitution in , when more than 60 percent of the Dutch electorate voted against it.

    According to him, the mainstream political parties imitate the "populist" parties: "In the end the European Parliament will only have Eu-rosceptics.

    That would be a catastrophe" [41]. Migrants must speak Dutch The Netherlands has been actively supporting mobility and other forms of migration as an outcome of the four European freedoms and the liberal state doctrine. With respect to the inclusion of migrants two periods of policy-making in the Netherlands can be distinguished. The first period started in , when the official policy document on migration stated that migrants had the right to preserve their heritage languages and cultures.

    As an outcome of this policy it was possible for migrant children to receive education in their home language in elementary schools paid for by the government. This educational policy gave contents to the concept of a multicultural society. However, in-depth studies on the language proficiency of migrants children, who had participated in home language education in elementary school, radically changed the policy perspective.

    It turned out that especially Turkish and Moroccan youngsters in their last year of elementary education at the age of twelve faced serious deficient language skills in Dutch compared to their Dutch classmates [42]. Due to the delay in language development migrant children had to qualify for lower types of secondary education resulting into a much worse position on the labor market.

    The government led by the Christian democratic PM Balkenende concluded that this situation was caused by the fact that migrant children were also educated in their home language at elementary school and by the fact that they spoke with their parents, who also faced deficient language skills in Dutch, their heritage language at home. Hence, the second Balkenende cabinet decided to abolish the state-sponsored heritage language education of migrant children in elementary school in From then on, all educational efforts were concentrated on teaching migrants and their children Dutch at school and preferably also in the home context.

    The switch from a multicultural to an assimilatory language policy was motivated first and foremost on economic ground. It was argued that improving Dutch language proficiency among migrants and their children was needed for strengthening their position on the labor market [43].

    However, this switch did not imply that migrants and their children were integrated successfully into the Dutch society. The outer circle of the floral configuration model became a space for 'Oth-ering' and exclusion of migrants.

    Anti-establishment politicians, like Wilders used the mobilizing power of language in the political messages targeted at "his" commoners, who were affected by the eurozone crisis most, and discriminated internally mobile European citizens, like Poles, and immigrants from outside Europe, or other newcomers, especially Muslims with language games.

    Consider some of these examples. In the annual general political debate in the Dutch Parliament on 16 September Wilders proposed to tax the Muslim headscarf as an expression of his disgust for this symbol of Muslim faith among women. He expressed this by his newly coined Dutch word 'hoofddoekjestaks'. Note the typical use of the Dutch diminutive plural '-jes' suffix attached to 'hoofddoek' "headscarf' and the Dutch spelling, i.

    His proposal was received with unbelief in the Dutch Parliament. At some point it was considered as a sick joke but then it all got the humiliating exclusive contents by replacing 'hoofddoekjestaks' with 'kopvoddentaks' that means "head-ragtax" where the Dutch word 'kop' has a clear pejorative meaning compared to the normal Dutch word for "head", i.

    According to Wilders, the 'kopvoddentaks' actually implies that any Muslim women who wants to wear a headscarf would have to apply for a license, and pay one thousand euro for the privilege.

    Johanna Schopenhauer (1766-1838)

    Wilders claimed the money raised would be used to support women's emancipation programs [44, p. Another neologism with the intention of Othering and exclusion of Muslim immigrants is Wilders' term 'haatbaard', i. Headscarves, hate-beards, burqas, men in weird long white dresses. Let us do something against this. With the newly coined term 'straatterroristen', i. However, instead of associating these gangs with acts of crimes he associates them with ideologically motivated acts of violence, like the killing of the Dutch film director Theo van Gogh by the Dutch-Moroccan Muslim fundamentalist Mohammed Bouyeri [ In sum, Wilders' rhetoric language is used as a political tool [39] to mobilize "his" electorate, the Dutch commoners and to exclude migrants.

    However, not only Dutch anti-establishment forces use language to demarcate socio-political positions, also the national cosmopolitans who are representing the state power use language for purposes of demarcation and exclusion as well.

    They use their power positions by controlling the normative variety of the official language of the Dutch state. This allows them to include their own clientele and to exclude migrants and newcomers on the labor market. The study of Ghorashi and Van Tilburg [46] among hundred highly educated refugee women, especially from Iran and Afghanistan who had gained the highest possible language skills for foreigners in the Netherlands demonstrate that these language skills seem to be the main obstacle to enter the labor market in the Netherlands.

    When applying for a job with a better organization or company they received the response "our company stands for high quality and people with accents do not fit the image of the organization.

    In conclusion, national cosmopolitan elites use in much more subtle manner the normative variety of Dutch than their anti-establishment counterparts. Conclusions and a Research Agenda So far Europeanization has been a project that has served the interests of the European elites, i. In the framework of the floral figuration model, I referred to the European elites as Eurostars and national cosmopolitans.

    However, the challenge is to keep Europe attractive not only for its elites but also for its commoners. Wallace et al. Hence, the task is to develop a genuine Social Europe that offers solidarity for all of its citizens.

    Although the diverging interests between the European elites and commoners has been noticed in the literature, such as in Neil Flig-stein's "Euro-clash" [11], it has gone unnoticed that the Euro-clash between social groups involves unbridgeable language conflicts as well.

    These language conflicts have been intensified due to the eurozone crisis. In this paper, I have argued that language issues are vital for the development of Social Europe.

    Although the importance of language and communication is recognized at the state level this topic is quite often neglected, when it comes to the European level. The interplay between multi-level and linguistic governance in Europe can best be analyzed in terms of the floral figuration model in the sense of De Swaan [1]. The typology of social actors, their language skills, their communication channels and styles, and their positioning in this model demonstrate that in the present constellation transparent, efficient and fair communication is impossible.

    The multilingual communication patterns are first and foremost group-specific and exclusivist, as the case study of the Netherlands demonstrates. This country has recently opted for a neoliberal welfare system to address the eurozone crisis, it has been unable to coop with recent mass immigration and as a consequence it has experienced a Euro-clash in which anti-establishment parties have become fixed political forces.

    The types of patterns of linguistic and communicative exclusion that turn up in the Dutch case will block any form of genuine solidarity or any relevant initiative for a common social policy in Europe. The introduction of an English based lingua franca in Europe referred to as Euro-English will not be sufficient to solve the linguistic and communicative deficits.

    English as a code of functional communication is not equipped to bridge the subtle semantics and concepts inherent in the social and political cultures of Europe. A standardized variety of English, i. BBC-English is also unfit to function as a European bridge language due to native speaker involvement excluding non-natives from native norms. Hence, the absence of a neutral, transparent and accessible lingua franca jeopardizes the development of Social Europe.

    As a task for further research I will elaborate on the refinement of the floral figuration model against the background of the typology of welfare states proposed by Esping-Andersen [31]. It is to be expected that much more patterns of linguistic and communicative exclusion will turn up in the process of fine-tuning. Another challenging task for further research is to elaborate on multilingual and transnational communication codes based on fairness.